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Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save 
troubled banks
Sahil Deo, Christian Franz, Christopher Gandrud, Mark Hallerberg
Abstract: We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution 
is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically 
important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as ‘systemically important’ varies 
based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is 
designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top 
level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically impor-
tant institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are respon-
sible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand govern-
ment support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European 
Banking Union.
Keywords: Federalism, financial crisis, bailouts, systemically important financial institu-
tions, Landesbanken
Schlagwörter: Föderalismus, Finanzkrise, Bail-outs, systemrelevante Finanzinstitute, Lan-
desbanken
1. Introduction1
Why do some jurisdictions have relatively few bank failures as the result of a fi-
nancial crisis, while others have relatively many, even if the crises start with simi-
lar levels of severity? To answer this question, we start with the assertion that 
banks do not naturally fail in some process that is separate from the state and 
politics. In a simple sense, a bank becomes insolvent when it is unable to meet its 
liabilities in a timely manner, including holding regulatory capital. A bank having 
trouble meeting its obligations or even one that is outright insolvent is well on its 
way to closing its doors. But this does not mean that it will necessarily fail.
Instead, letting a bank fail is a government decision. If politicians wanted to 
prevent a failure, they have numerous tools at their disposal to help failing banks 
limp along and even rebuild. They could choose forbearance, recapitalization, li-
quidity support, and purchasing troubled assets with publicly guaranteed funds 
through a ‘bad bank’, to name only a few options. These policies can be very ex-
1 Thank you to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for generous financial support.
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pensive. Laeven and Valencia (2012) find that from 1997 through 2011 the me-
dian public cost of responding to financial crises was estimated to be about 6.8 
percent of GDP. If letting banks fail is a potentially expensive political decision, 
why do politicians choose to prevent banks from failing?
Previous research has posited a number of factors that may shape public deci-
sions to close or alternatively prop-up troubled banks. These include industry 
capture and crony capitalism (Rosas 2006), regulators’ reputations and post-pub-
lic service employment prospects (Kane 1989), bureaucratic capacity (Satyanath 
2006, p. 18), veto players (Alesina and Drazen 1991; MacIntyre 2001; Satyanath 
2006), information games played between regulators and politicians (Gandrud 
and O’Keeffe 2013), how bargaining is structured between banks and govern-
ments (Grossman and Woll 2014; Woll 2014), and political institutions such as 
democracy and electoral competitiveness (Keefer 2007; Rosas 2006, 2009) along 
with their interaction with interest group-state coalitions (Calomiris and Haber 
2014). However, none of these approaches explain which and what types of 
banks are saved.
One of the most prevalent reasons given in the finance literature for why some 
banks receive public assistance to prevent their failure is that they are too big to 
fail or, more broadly, that they are systemically important (Thomson 2010, p. 2). 
However, defining and measuring whether or not a given bank is systemically 
important is not easy (Segoviano and Goodhart 2009), especially before a trou-
bled bank actually does fail, when politicians are deciding whether or not to save 
it. This raises the question: how do politicians decide if a bank is important 
enough to need saving?
In this paper, we seek to improve our understanding of why politicians choose 
to save a bank (or not). We argue that politicians are more likely to prevent the 
failure of banks that are systemically important to them. Our novel contribution 
is to define more clearly what systemic importance means to policy-makers. Ra-
ther than assume that politicians use a purely objective financial definition of 
systemic importance, we argue that what policy-makers view as their financial 
system varies based on the overlap between banks’ activities and who politicians 
rely on for electoral support. A key political institution shaping the group that 
politicians rely on for electoral support is federalism. Federalism influences both: 
which politicians have the power and means to prevent bank failures (national or 
sub-national), as well as which constituencies are important for politicians to re-
main in office. Federalism also shapes how policies evolve over time, especially 
when there are conflicts between different government levels that share banking 
competencies.
Not all federations are designed equally. Some federations endow only the top-
level jurisdiction with banking policy competencies, while in other federations 
these competencies are shared between the top and provincial levels. So, it is inap-
propriate to use a one size fits all understanding of the effect federalism has on 
bank assistance. A simple dichotomous federalism variable will not be illuminat-
ing and will likely produce null findings. We need to look at how each federation 
is designed, particularly at what levels have exclusive or shared banking policy 
competencies, as well as how disputes between the levels are adjudicated.
Abhandlung
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We begin the paper with a review of the political economy literature on bank 
bailouts and, in particular, the proposition that systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFI) are more likely to be aided with public rescues. We build on 
this literature to develop a novel theory of how vesting different levels of a fed-
eration with banking competencies influences which banks politicians decide to 
save. We then examine our theory in light of decisions made in Germany during 
the early stages of the 2008–09 financial crisis. This case is initially anomalous. 
Despite a popular perception of Germany being an adamant opponent of bank 
bailouts during the Eurozone crisis, considerable public support was given to 
German banks and only three very small banks were allowed to fail during the 
height of the crisis. We argue that the structure of German federalism and bank-
ing sector competencies explains this apparent contradiction. Sub-national Ger-
man Länder (provincial) governments have considerable power over, and are 
deeply intertwined with, regional banks. This Verflechtung (or intertwining), 
when added to the more general Politikverflechtung of the German federal sys-
tem, means that multiple levels of government have influence over policy (Scharpf 
1985) with an important policy affect: many banks that were not systemically 
important from a national perspective were nonetheless prevented from failing at 
the onset of the recent crisis because they were important to Länder-level politi-
cians. Our research has important implications for predicting the sort of support 
that is likely to be extended to banks in federations, a topic that is particularly 
important for the nascent European Banking Union.
2. Public responses to failing banks – Review
In this section we discuss previous work in the political economy and finance lit-
eratures to understand support to troubled banks. This literature provides a good 
base for studying public assistance to troubled banks, but has important short-
comings.
2.1 Previous political economy literature
There is a growing political economy literature on public responses to failing 
banks and financial crises. A portion of this research focuses on trying to explain 
the overall type or level of public responses to failing banks in terms of broad 
policy choices and ultimate fiscal costs. Keefer (2007) examines how electorally 
competitive countries are more likely to have lower crisis response costs. He also 
finds that less electorally competitive countries are more likely to use forbearance 
with troubled banks. Similarly, Rosas (2006, 2009) finds that democracies are 
more likely to use what he calls “bagehot” policies, such as providing short-term 
liquidity support backed by good collateral, to aid sound banks while imposing 
costs on and closing troubled banks. Autocracies are more likely to use costly 
bailouts that favor narrow banking interests. Grossman and Woll (2014) argue 
that governments with close one-to-one relationships with banks tend to have 
larger public bailouts than governments that deal with the banking sector collec-
tively.
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Others examine why policy-makers may delay troubled bank failures through 
some form of regulatory forbearance. Kane (1989) argues that regulators may 
choose to delay publicising the poor health of a bank in order to maintain their 
reputation until they can move on to other employment. Gandrud and O’Keeffe 
(2013) argue that information games between banks, regulators, and policy-mak-
ers can lead politicians to provide more support to troubled banks during crises 
than they ultimately prefer.
A strain of the political economy literature examines how veto players may 
change the pace with which public policy responses to crises are created and en-
acted. It may be that when there are more policy-makers whose agreement is 
needed for new policies to pass, the slower the policy response will be (Alesina 
and Drazen 1991). Rodrik (1999) argues that how the veto players are organized 
is important for determining the speed of the public response. MacIntyre (2001) 
provides some evidence that there is a “U-shaped” relationship between the num-
ber of veto players and crisis outcomes, with a middle level of veto players result-
ing in the best outcomes.
In a related strain of literature mostly written before the 2008–09 crisis, politi-
cal economy scholars examined the possibility that financial regulatory policies 
were converging as a result of globalising financial markets. Countries were an-
ticipated to adjust their regulatory regime to a global standard. However, Lütz 
(1997, 2003) and Busch (2003, 2009) recognized that, as with banking resolution 
choices, there is not a clear trend towards such convergence in financial market 
regulation.
Despite this diversity of work, the political economy literature has not directly 
addressed the issue of which particular troubled institutions are likely to receive 
public support, nor developed a good way of predicting the aggregate number of 
bank rescues. It has also not considered the role that federalism may play in these 
processes.
2.2 Defining the system in systemic importance
There has been a vibrant discussion, especially after the start of the 2008–09 fi-
nancial crisis, about how to define and measure a financial institution’s systemic 
importance (e. g., Billio et al. 2012; Laeven et al. 2014; Segoviano and Goodhart 
2009; Thomson 2010; Zhou 2010).
An unaddressed question is: what is the geographic scope of the financial sys-
tem? There are two financial system levels most often discussed in the literature: 
national and global. For example, Thomson (2010, pp. 2–3) lays out a number of 
different methods for determining if a bank is systemically important. Similarly, 
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) focus on nations (the United States), interna-
tional regions (e. g. Europe), or the global financial system. Formal models, such 
as Zhou (2010), typically treat the financial system as given and do not define its 
geographic scope. French et al. (2010) make a policy suggestion that countries 
should establish national systemic risk regulators based within their central 
banks.
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The terms ‘systemically important’ and ‘too big to fail’ nonetheless implicitly 
rely on a correspondence between the financial system and governments’ jurisdic-
tions. The literature on too big to fail in particular has developed the theory that 
banks have incentives to change their behaviour based on the size of the jurisdic-
tion that oversees them. Banks want to become bigger (Acharya and Yorulmazer 
2007) within their regulators’ and politicians’ jurisdiction in order to receive bail-
outs if they run into trouble. The underlying assumption is that policy-makers 
want to prevent a systemic banking crisis. If one does occur, they will attempt to 
contain it in order to prevent the crisis’ negative externalities from severely dam-
aging the real economy (Rosas 2009, p. 6) and hurting those whose support poli-
ticians need to stay in office. Bankers recognize that policy-makers have this pref-
erence. To maximize their chances of receiving public bailouts, and therefore also 
minimize their borrowing costs, as their debts receive an implicit “too big to fail 
subsidy”, bankers try to become systemically important. They can do this by 
growing in size and becoming more interconnected (Kane 2000). Brewer and Jag-
tiani (2013) find evidence for this behaviour by looking at the premiums banks 
pay for mergers that would turn them into too big to fail banks, compared to 
mergers that would not have done this.
The SIFI literature provides evidence that policy-makers have an awareness of 
what their banking system is and that bankers also understand policy-makers’ 
perspective. However, most of the research again has been on national financial 
systems. Almost no attention has been given to understanding why regulators and 
policy-makers would view the national level as the financial system that they care 
about.
3. Our argument: federalism and systemic importance
In this section, we lay out our argument for how federalism, and specifically 
which level of the federation has control over banking policy, conditions which 
banks are regarded as systemically important and so are likely to be assisted. This 
also allows us to predict the overall proportion of banks that are likely to be as-
sisted if they are in trouble.
To understand how politicians determine the relevant financial system unit that 
they are concerned with, we first make the standard assumption that politicians 
are office-seeking. Incumbents act in order to stay in office. They will therefore be 
primarily concerned with mitigating the negative externalities of bank failures to 
those whose support they need to remain in office. In democracies supporters 
generally means voters.2 The maximum pool of voters that an incumbent can 
draw supporters from–what Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) refer to as the selec-
torate–is generally defined by the boundaries of the area they have jurisdiction 
over and, in democracies, electoral system rules. For example, the selectorate for 
the president of the United States is clearly the voters of the United States. The 
incumbent president does not require the support of every member of the US elec-
2 Our argument could easily be extended to autocracies. However, our regional focus in this paper 
is on Europe, so we limit ourselves to a discussion of policy-making in democracies.
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torate. Instead, the support of some winning coalition of voters is needed, who in 
turn elect delegates on a state-by-state basis, to remain in office through the next 
election.
Regardless of what exactly constrains the winning coalitions that politicians 
can form, in the banking realm they will be concerned with saving banks whose 
failure would have negative consequences for these supporters. Incumbents are 
strategic in how they target goods to voters to create winning coalitions. Their 
strategies are shaped by the prevailing political institutions (Persson and Tabellini 
2004). 
Incumbents focus on aiding banks that are important for a banking system 
that corresponds to their jurisdiction, and specifically to their electoral support-
ers. National-level politicians typically assist banks that are systemically impor-
tant on a national scale, because national systemic banking crises will hurt their 
electoral supporters. They will also aid banks that are important to the govern-
ment’s electoral winning coalition specifically, even if they are not nationally sys-
temically important. This motivation could push them to extend support to banks 
that are based beyond their borders if the banks threaten the stability of their 
own national banking system and their supporters. A good example of this is the 
intervention in 2011 by European Union Member States to aid Spanish banks in 
order to avoid bank failure contagion from spreading to their banking systems.
Negative externalities from bank failures are often in the form of credit con-
tractions to the private economy that lead to contractions of the real economy 
(for a detailed account see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Public finances and public 
policy-making more generally can also be directly and intimately tied to the bank-
ing sector. The very existence of modern banking is the result of political impera-
tives, especially the need to finance public policy projects (Neal 2000) that gener-
ally please incumbent supporters (Calomiris and Haber 2014). The recent 
increased importance of banks–or the financial sector as a whole–through a pro-
cess of “Financialization” (Epstein 2005)3 may further heighten the negative ex-
ternalities of bank failures. As a result of this process not only have financial elites 
and financial institutions become more powerful, but capital ownership in general 
became more popular among middle class households. These new “financialized 
masses” (Erturk et al. 2007) have an intrinsic interest in preventing bank failures. 
They may well be a highly relevant voter group for politicians who want to get 
reelected.
If the federal division of competencies does not give national policy-makers 
exclusive jurisdiction over banking policy, but instead there is shared responsibil-
ity, the question then becomes, how do the relevant sub-national policy-makers 
define systemic importance? They may care about the national levels because of 
possible spill-overs to their region, but if sub-national voters decide their fate di-
rectly they will care most about sub-national banks in their constituency. One 
would expect them to be concerned with avoiding the pain that bank failures 
3 “Financialization refers to the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, finan-
cial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions, 
both at the national and international level” (Epstein 2005, p. 2).
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would inflict on their supporters, that is, banks that are important to their sub-
national banking system. 
This conclusion has important novel implications for predicting the number of 
banks that are likely to receive public support when sub-national, as opposed to 
national-level policy-makers, are responsible for banks. We predict that:
In federations where sub-national governments have partial or sole responsibility 
for banking, over time more banks will receive public assistance, and these banks 
given aid will be on average smaller than those that are given aid in federations 
where the national government has sole responsibility for banking.
One important banking sector competency that national and sub-national gov-
ernments may have is direct ownership stakes in banks that enable them to direct 
bank lending to supporters. Failures of banks with significant public ownership 
stakes mean that governments may lose this tool. These failures also clearly have 
a direct impact on governments’ financial positions, thus hampering their ability 
to please supporters with fiscal expenditures. We would expect that as govern-
ments have larger ownership stakes in banks and / or rely more on financing from 
banks in their jurisdictions for projects to please their supporters they will be 
even more unwilling to simply let ‘their’ banks fail. Allowing sub-national govern-
ments to have ownership stakes in banks will shape which institutions receive 
public assistance when they run into trouble.
A good example of this is the recent case of the Austrian lender Hypo Alpe 
Adria. The Austrian Land of Carinthia partially owned the lender, provided it 
with generous guarantees, and “found it a useful source of funds for prestige pro-
jects and [governing political] party coffers” (The Economist 2014). When it got 
into trouble during the 2008–09 financial crisis, Hypo Alpe Adria received con-
siderable public financial support from the Land and national governments and 
was ultimately nationalized in 2009. Both the Carinthia and national govern-
ments viewed Hypo Alpe Adria as systemically important and therefore in need of 
assistance (The Economist 2014). 
Swiss cantonal banks are another apt example. These institutions are often 
guaranteed and at least partially owned by regional canton governments. The 
banks are important providers of credit to their local economies. During the 1990s 
Swiss banking crisis many small regional banks were closed or merged without 
direct public assistance, but the cantonal banks received public assistance from 
their cantons to maintain their operations (Basel Committee 2004, pp. 46–47).
Finally, though a given level of government may initially assist a bank that is 
systemically important to it, the specific federal structure will also shape how this 
assistance evolves over time. This is particularly important in jurisdictions where 
banking and related powers are shared between multiple levels of government 
with different views of systemic importance. For example, in the Austrian case 
cited above, the Austrian national government later decided to assert increased 
control over banking policy by annulling Carinthia’s guarantees to Hypo Alpe 
Adria (Reuters 2014). Governments can use competencies in non-banking policy 
areas to influence banking policy decisions at other federal levels. For example, a 
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sub-national government may assist a regionally important bank, but become fis-
cally constrained by this decision. It may then need fiscal support from a higher 
level of government. Politicians at the higher level may not view helping the re-
gional bank as important to its supporters. It may then make fiscal assistance 
conditional on the sub-national government removing its support for the bank, 
possibly leading to the bank’s failure.
4. Failures and federalism in Germany
In this section we find empirical support for our argument with a detailed case 
study of the decision-making processes behind German policy-makers’ choices to 
provide public assistance to financial institutions during the recent 2008–09 fi-
nancial crisis. The facts of the German case do not fit with the popular image of 
the anti-bailout state that many of its actions during the Eurozone crisis fostered 
and it is difficult for previous political economy and finance theories to explain. 
Despite having a severe banking crisis, only three banks failed during the early 
stages of the crisis, and very few banks would eventually fail after receiving con-
siderable public support. Many of the banks that were actively aided by govern-
ments were not nationally systemically important. Furthermore, Germany had 
competitive elections that previous theories have posited would minimize bail-
outs.
In one of the most recent examinations of the 2008–09 German banking crisis, 
Woll (2014) argues that German bailouts were so large overall because the gov-
ernment was unable to get the banking industry to coordinate on contributing to 
its own salvation. Instead, the government had to deal with troubled banks indi-
vidually. This is in contrast to Denmark, which also has a traditionally coordi-
nated economy and pillared banking system, but which was able to find a collec-
tive solution to its very severe banking crisis. The solution involved considerable 
private sector participation and a dozen bank failures, including some of the 
country’s largest banks (Woll 2014, Ch. 7). Given the traditionally coordinated 
nature of German capitalism and its similarities with Denmark, why was a Ger-
man collective solution so hard to find?
Germany’s close correspondence between federal layers of government and the 
banking system is the major contrast between Germany and Denmark. In Den-
mark the national government controls banking policy. Unlike in Germany, Dan-
ish banks cannot expect local government support and are therefore more likely 
to coordinate on a national solution to banking difficulties.
4.1 Overview of the German banking system
Banks traditionally dominate the German financial system. They compose the 
largest share of external corporate financing through loans (Krahnen and Schmidt 
2004; Hackethal et al. 2006). Federal governments did promote the development 
of German securities markets (Initiative Finanzplatz Deutschland) in the 1990s, 
which led the corporate world to rely more on capital markets for financing than 
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before (Enderlein 2011), but banks continue to play an important role in corpo-
rate financing (Deutsche Bundesbank 2012).
The banking system in Germany comprises three types of banks: Private com-
mercial banks, cooperative banks, and public banks. The geographical scope and 
ownership structures of banks in these three pillars create tiered webs of national 
and regional stakeholders. In many ways, the structures of German banks mirror 
the structures of German federalism. Private banks have focussed on national and 
international business and have traditionally financed large industrial firms. Re-
gionally based public and cooperative banks are focussed on retail banking and 
provision of loans to consumers, as well as small and medium-sized companies 
within their regions. The group of public banks consists of 426 local savings 
banks and ten regional Landesbanken which act as house banks for the German 
Länder and as wholesale banks for the local savings banks (Detzer et al. 2013). In 
the 1960s the Landesbanken, such as WestLB, were supported by regional policy-
makers to expand and, in so doing, break the traditional monopoly of the big 
private banks in the syndicate business (Seikel 2013; Dieckmann 2012, p. 34).
The Landesbanken have been considerably transformed in the last 20 years as 
the state-bank link has been weakened, often due to European Commission com-
petition rulings. Nonetheless, these banks continue to be relevant for provincial 
and local governments. It is important to highlight the mechanisms linking these 
banks to provincial politicians. These mechanisms play a pivotal role in the deci-
sion-making process behind choices to let a bank fail or not.
1. Legal provision to serve the public interest: The justification for the existence 
of public banks, i. e. the savings banks and the Landesbanken, within a mar-
ket-based economy is founded on the obligation to serve the public interest. 
The goal of these banks should not be just profit maximization, but rather 
fulfill a public task on the provincial level.
2. Government-Savings banks-Landesbanken nexus: The governance structure 
of the public banks creates extensive ties among provincial governments, lo-
cal savings banks, and the regional Landesbanken. The savings banks and the 
respective German Land often have significant ownership shares in Landes-
banken.4 
3. Economic policy tool: The Landesbanken have traditionally played an impor-
tant role in provincial-level politics, because governments use them to pursue 
policy goals, such as supporting new industries.5 A case in point is HSH 
Nord bank, which in 2013 granted 40 percent of its total financial volume to 
clients in the region of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (HSH Nordbank 
2013). Another prominent example is the role WestLB played in the economic 
transformation of North Rhine-Westphalia from an economy based on steel 
4 See European Commission reports on state aid procedure (European Commission 2008a-e; Euro-
pean Commission 2009a).
5 In one of our interviews, a senior official of the German Federal Agency for Financial Market 
Stabilisation (FMSA) explained the mechanism as follows: While every one euro of the state bud-
get results in one euro public spending, the possibility to use leverage means that one euro in the 
Landesbank translates into ten euros of public spending. 
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and coal to one based on services. Between the 1980s and 1990s the bank 
bought shares in regional industries. This strategy was supported by–or at 
least tolerated by–the province’s premier (Dieckmann 2012).
Having Landesbanken available to fund public policy initiatives is particularly im-
portant within the institutional design of German federalism. They are one of the 
few policy instruments that are at the discretion of the Länder. Sub-national level 
policy-makers need to cater primarily to their electorate in their respective area. 
The support of the electorate is dependent on the success of the regional economy 
and employment situation. However, German “cooperative federalism” (Kisker 
1971) limits policy-making competencies at the sub-national level. While the im-
plementation of Federal and Länder laws lies almost entirely with the Länder, core 
policy-making competencies for pleasing supporters such as taxation, labour mar-
ket policies, and social policies are concentrated at the national level. As Scharpf 
(2001, 2007) highlighted, if state governments want to have a competitive advan-
tage over other states inside of Germany or towards their European neighbours, 
the competencies that they have at their discretion are industry, infrastructure, and 
education policies. Being able to influence a Landesbank’s lending is a powerful 
additional tool Länder governments can use to please their supporters.
4.2 The German banking crisis and political responses
Amidst the German institutional setting, the financial crisis of 2008–09 led to pub-
lic support for many banks. The federal government alone supported eleven banks 
with either guarantees or recapitalization. Some banks were even nationalised to 
prevent their failure. These choices were always justified with the argument that a 
failure of one of these banks would lead to the failure of the others (German 
Council of Economic Experts 2012). As we will see, German Länder were also 
very active in providing assistance to regionally important banks. This is in sharp 
contrast to determinations of systemic importance in other contexts. In the United 
States, for example, very large and highly interconnected banks, such as Citigroup, 
were viewed as systemically important and received considerable public support. 
However, many smaller troubled regional banks were not viewed as systemically 
important by the Federal government–which had almost sole jurisdiction over 
banks–and were instead allowed to fail. The United States Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) reports that 494 banks failed in the US between 2008 
and July 2013 (Sapir and Wolff 2013, p. 5). In contrast, only three German domes-
tic banks did not receive public support and failed during the height of the crisis. 
All of them had tiny balance sheets. The largest was Noa bank, with about €180 
million in assets. None of them had public owners.6 Some larger banks that did 
receive public assistance, such as Hypo Real Estate and WestLB, were eventually 
wound down. However, this was after a restructuring process mandated by the 
most distant federal institution: the European Commission.
6 Weserbank failed in April 2008, Noa bank failed in August 2010, and the much smaller FXdirekt 
Bank AG failed in December 2012. Information based on BaFin press releases on “Moratoria”. 
169
Deo/Franz/Gandrud/Hallerberg | Preventing German Bank Failures
There is some debate over whether the Landesbanken sector is systemically 
relevant from a national perspective. Schrooten (2010) argues that the Landes-
banken are systemically relevant, because the combined balance sheet of Landes-
banken and savings banks who are important Landesbanken shareholders con-
tribute a large share to the total assets of the banking sector (30 percent in 2012). 
Conversely, Hellwig and Weder di Mauro (2009) questioned German policy-mak-
ers’ interpretation of systemic importance. They see the lack of a restructuring 
framework for banks that would allow an orderly liquidation as leading govern-
ments to rescue too many banks. They argue that systemic importance becomes in 
such an environment a term that can be claimed by any bank. In particular, Hell-
wig and Weder di Mauro mention the example of the Hypo Real Estate (HRE)–a 
Munich-based real estate bank–that was considered to be systemically important 
because of its relevance for the Pfandbrief-covered bond-markets.7
We examine different cases of German banks receiving public support during 
the 2008–09 financial crisis. We capture the full range of types of troubled banks 
that received public assistance. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the support provided 
the German banking institutions we look at in detail. On the one hand, we argue 
that there were banks that received assistance because national policy-makers 
considered them to be systemically important at the national level. Among those 
is Commerzbank, which was viewed as systemically important by the Federal 
government because of its size (it is the second largest bank in Germany). Also 
included in this group is Hypo Real Estate. It was a major issuer of Pfandbriefe 
and thus highly interconnected. On the other hand, there are banks that were 
systemically important to sub-national governments. These were the Landesbank-
en WestLB and HSH Nordbank. 
Table 1: Selection of Nationally Systemically Important Banks
Commerzbank HRE
Employees &  
Total assets
43,169; €625 billion (2008) Approx. 1,900; Approx. €400 
billion (2008)
Scope / Size of 
 rescue measures
Recapitalization (€8.2 billion) and  
guarantee framework for securities  
(€15 billion) (‘SoFFin I’)
Subsequently, additional equity capital 
provided (€10 billion) 
(‘SoFFin II’) 
Guarantee framework 
(reached up to €124 billion) 
Recapitalization (€9.8 billion)
Subsequent nationalization 
and the creation of a bad 
bank 
Who rescued? Special Market Stabilisation Funds  
(SoFFin)
SoFFin
Source: Commerzbank: European Commission 2009b; HRE: European Commission 2008c.
7 Pfandbriefe are fixed income bonds that are considered to be almost as safe as public bonds and 
are the subject of particular legislation, the German Pfandbrief Act.
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5. Saving Nationally Relevant Banks
5.1 Commerzbank
In general, Commerzbank “was affected less than average by the financial market 
crisis owing to the bank’s focus on retail and commercial banking and its low-key 
proprietary trading and investment activities” (European Commission 2009 b). 
Nonetheless, the failure of Lehman Brothers and continuing troubles in the sub-
prime markets hit its trading and investment portfolios hard. At that time, Com-
merzbank had around 43,000 employees and total assets of €625 billion in 2008 
which would become about €1,100 billion once its merger with Dresdner Bank 
was completed (European Commission 2009 b; Commerzbank 2008).
5.1.1  Crisis unfolds and result
Revaluations of its public sector portfolio and the bankruptcies of Lehman Broth-
ers and a number of Icelandic banks greatly diminished Commerzbank’s capital 
reserves and the additional capital increase implemented in fall 2008 to assist the 
recent purchase of Dresdner Bank proved insufficient. To avoid imminent insol-
vency, public assistance was provided to Commerzbank in two-steps, SoFFin I 
and SoFFin II. In total, capital measures of €18.2 billion were provided, alongside 
a €15 billion guarantee (European Commission 2009 b).
5.1.2  Systemic importance?
It is clear from Germany’s position in the European Commission’s hearing that 
Commerzbank was viewed as a “systemically important credit institution”, which 
should not come as a surprise as it was the second largest bank in Germany in 
terms of credit provision (European Commission 2009b).
5.2 Hypo Real Estate
While Commerzbank may be a fairly straightforward case of systemic importance 
on the national level due to its size, it is important to look at another major Ger-
man bank rescue to capture another mechanism that can trigger national sys-
temic importance: interconnectedness. Interconnectedness is especially important 
in the German Pfandbriefe market. These covered interest-bearing bonds are is-
sued on the capital market by licensed credit institutions and represent one of the 
largest fixed income markets in the world (Prokopczuk et al. 2013).
We will focus here on the most prominent case of a troubled private bank issu-
ing Pfandbriefe–Hypo Real Estate. The Munich-based HRE focussed on commer-
cial real estate finance. HRE’s business model was extremely successful in the 
years prior to the crisis. While in 2003, HRE ranked fourteenth among German 
banks in terms of total assets (€152.9 billion), it rose to seventh in 2008, with 
total assets of €419.7 billion.
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5.2.1  Crisis unfolds and result
Supported by a favourable pre-crisis business environment, HRE was working on 
a high-risk investment strategy as well as acquiring other institutions. The most 
prominent bank that HRE took over–and probably the most problematic–was 
the Dublin-based DEPFA Bank. The acquisition, completed in October 2007, al-
most doubled HRE’s balance sheet (Handelsblatt 2007). DEPFA refinanced long-
term credits for public sector projects with short- or medium-term credit lines 
(European Commission 2008 c). This business model was highly reliant on the 
inter-banking market, which came to a sudden halt after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse. DEPFA and HRE quickly faced a liquidity shortage that threatened their 
solvency.
From this moment on, HRE became dependent on public support to prevent it 
from failing. Between fall 2008 and the end of 2010, HRE received government 
guarantees of €124 billion. Between March 2009 and November 2009, SoFFin 
recapitalized and eventually nationalized HRE. In September 2010, HRE estab-
lished a publicly owned asset management company and transferred a portfolio 
worth €173 billion to the new entity (European Commission 2011). Due to these 
massive state aid measures, the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition (DG Comp) demanded that the bank be significantly restructured 
(Buder et al. 2011).
5.2.2  Systemic importance?
The question of whether HRE was really systemically important has been heat-
edly discussed (Hellwig and Weder di Mauro 2009) among policy-makers and 
researchers. In February 2009, finance minister Peer Steinbrück said in an inter-
view to the Kieler Nachrichten newspaper that HRE had to be stabilized in order 
to stabilize the Pfandbrief market.8 The German government argued that it was 
not only HRE’s size that was the largest threat of a failure, but HRE’s massive 
stock of outstanding Pfandbrief  bonds. According to a reply by the German gov-
ernment to a parliamentary inquiry, HRE and its subsidiaries constituted the sec-
ond largest issuer of Pfandbriefe.9 Therefore, a failure of HRE had to be avoided 
in order to prevent any damage to the good reputation of the German Pfandbrief 
(Bundestag 2009).
8 In the German original, Peer Steinbrück said: “Sie [HRE] muss stabilisiert werden – damit auch 
der deutsche Pfandbriefmarkt” (Bundestag 2009).
9 It is important to note that other troubled banks had a high stock of outstanding Pfandbriefe in 
2008, but were not rescued on the base of their risk to the Pfandbrief market. This is because of 
the different crises banks experienced. While Pfandbriefe are resilient towards an insolvency of 
the issuer, because the cover pool is not part of the insolvency procedure, a liquidity crisis of a 
bank is problematic for the performance of Pfandbriefe, because then the issuer cannot provide 
timely payment to the bondholder. The example of LBBW illustrates this difference: The bank 
held Pfandbriefe worth €74 billion on its balance sheet, roughly 10 percent of all outstanding 
Pfandbriefe at the time. However, LBBW’s liquidity was never in doubt, rather the bank needed 
further capital to fulfill the regulatory requirements. The differences between these cases were also 
confirmed by the revaluation of the Pfandbriefe by the rating agency S&P which links the rating 
for the Pfandbrief also to the liquidity risk of the issuer (Cünnen 2009).
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Table 2: Selection of Banks Important to Sub-National Banking Systems
 WestLB HSH Nordbank
Employees &  
Total assets
5,663; €281.1 billion (2008) 5,070; €208.9 billion (2008)
Scope / Size of re-
scue measures
Risk shield (€5 billion)
and subsequent creation of a bad bank 
(which included recapitalization by 
SoFFin)
Recapitalisation (€3 billion) and a 
“risk shield” (€10 billion)
Additional guarantees by SoFFin 
(up to €30 billion)
Who rescued? Shareholders, the vast majority of 
which are controlled by NRW and 
 local savings banks.
Länder of Freie- und Hansestadt 
Hamburg and Land Schleswig-
Holstein
Source: WestLB: European Commission 2008e; HSH Nordbank: European Commission 2009a.
6. Saving Sub-Nationally Relevant Banks
In the next section, we analyse public assistance to Landesbanken WestLB and 
HSH Nordbank to demonstrate that regional policy-makers with responsibility 
for banking provided similar assistance as their national counterparts when their 
constituents’ interests were at risk.
6.1 WestLB
“In the current discussion, we speak about the future of WestLB, the financial 
center Düsseldorf, 6,000 employees, and the future of the Landesbanken,”10 said 
the premier of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Jürgen Rüttgers, during an inter-
view on the potential acquisition of WestLB by another Landesbank (Landesbank 
of Baden-Württemberg, LBBW) in August 2007. In doing so, he highlighted sev-
eral important aspects of regional policy-makers views’ about Landesbanken in 
general and WestLB in particular.
The Düsseldorf-based WestLB had the tenth largest balance sheet in Germany. 
In 2007, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia owned about 37.7 percent of West-
LB’s shares, the local savings banks together owned about 50.3 percent, and local 
municipalities owned the remaining 12 percent. The bank had struggled for some 
years already and had failed to find a functioning business model after the re-
moval of the Landesbanken’s state guarantees. This led to a disastrous track re-
cord for the bank. It had an accumulated loss before tax from 2001–07 of about 
€5.08 billion (European Commission 2010).
10 Original: “In der aktuellen Diskussion geht es um die Zukunft der WestLB, den Finanzplatz Düs-
seldorf, es geht um 6000 Arbeitsplätze und um die Zukunft der Landesbanken” (Ludwig 2007).
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6.1.1  Crisis unfolds and result
Following the removal of public guarantees, WestLB moved into new investment 
markets including the U.S. subprime market. As a result, the financial market cri-
sis hit WestLB’s portfolio hard and resulted in significant write-downs and diffi-
culties refinancing its business. On January 20, 2008, the owners of WestLB–the 
state of North Rhine-Westphalia and the savings banks–gathered for an emer-
gency meeting to find a solution for an expected 2007 loss of €1 billion and fur-
ther expected write-downs of €1 billion from the deteriorating value of assets on 
WestLB’s balance sheet. The first plan of providing capital injections worth 
€2 billion to WestLB was rapidly replaced by a more far reaching “risk shield” of 
€5  billion when the German regulator’s stress test revealed more significant 
threats (European Commission 2008e).11
This first attempt to stabilize WestLB, however, proved to be insufficient. On 
November 24, 2009, the German government and WestLB’s shareholders agreed 
to establish a bad bank winding-down agency–the Erste Abwicklungsanstalt 
(EAA)–to which the bank could transfer its impaired assets and relieve its balance 
sheet from the constant pressure of having to keep more capital to account for 
these assets.
The European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition was again 
crucial in the decision to ultimately wind down the bank. DG Comp demanded 
significant restructuring of WestLB due to the high level of state aid it received. 
Initially the plan was to restructure WestLB. However, over the course of the fol-
lowing year it became clear that restructuring WestLB was impossible within the 
Commission’s rules. First, attempted mergers between the WestLB and other 
Landesbanken (such as the BayernLB) failed largely for political reasons, then the 
negotiation with other investors did not deliver any further results and eventually 
the bank came to the understanding that a reduction of the total assets to 20 per-
cent of WestLB’s former size–one condition laid out by the European Commis-
sion–would not leave a viable business. As a result, the Federal government and 
the owners of WestLB decided to liquidate WestLB and split it into three parts of 
which one was sold to Helaba, a second part was transferred to the bad bank and 
a third part continues to exist to assist the winding-down of the bad bank’s assets.
6.1.2  Systemic importance?
The abolition of the Gewährträgerhaftung guarantees resulted not only in the 
Landesbanken’s expansion into new business areas, but also increased pressure to 
consolidate. The politically charged nature of the mergers indicate how important 
regional politicians viewed their banks to be. A key example is the failed acquisi-
tion of WestLB by LBBW in August 2007. The Premier of NRW at the time, Jürgen 
Rüttgers, rejected the plans, because he feared they would reduce the significance 
11 The agreement between the owners determined that the first €2 billion of these guarantees would 
be covered by all shareholders according to their share in the WestLB. If the loss would exceed 
these €2 billion NRW would bear the remaining €3 billion on its own. 
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of Düsseldorf, a key city in his Land, as a leading financial centre (Handelsblatt 
2010). In the spring of 2008 it was already too late to find a buyer for WestLB and 
the negotiations with Helaba (the Landesbank of Hesse and Thuringia) failed be-
cause Helaba’s shareholders feared the risks in WestLB assets (Köhler 2008).
Despite WestLB’s huge losses and the widespread opinion among observers that 
the bank has no functioning business model (e. g. von Hiller 2007), the govern-
ment of NRW and the savings banks provided extensive guarantees. The support 
was strongest among the savings banks that owned parts of WestLB and resisted 
until the very end the plans to break up the bank. Without the influence of the 
European Commission, public support for the bank likely would have continued.
6.2 HSH Nordbank
“We want a bank, which can support the export oriented North German mid-
sized industry abroad” was the way Premier Heide Simonis of Schleswig-Holstein 
justified the merger between the Landesbanken of Hamburg and Schleswig-Hol-
stein, which led to the creation of HSH Nordbank in 2003 (Deutsche Welle 
2013). HSH Nordbank was a recipient of state guarantees that other Landes-
banken enjoyed as well, the end of which necessitated changing the core business 
model. Nonetheless, the bank remained largely publicly owned. Prior to the crisis, 
majority shareholders of HSH Nordbank were public.
6.2.1  Crisis unfolds and result
Being headquartered in Hamburg, a major port, HSH Nordbank is heavily in-
volved in shipping finance. As the financial crisis hit, overcapacity in the shipping 
container industry along with historically low charter prices strained HSH Nord-
bank’s business model (Brautlecht 2014). HSH Nordbank suffered a €2.8 billion 
loss in 2008. It received a bailout of €13 billion from two German states in Feb-
ruary 2009 (Spiegel 2009). Nonetheless, HSH Nordbank’s losses continued to 
mount with a reported loss of €124 million in 2012 and €814 million in 2014 
(Brautlecht 2014).
6.2.2  Systemic importance?
There are clear parallels between this case and WestLB’s in terms of HSH Nord-
bank’s importance to regional politicians. A large percentage of loans made by 
HSH Nordbank go to clients in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein.12 HSH Nord-
bank’s market penetration among potential regional clients is more than 50 per-
cent. In 2008, HSH Nordbank had approximately 5,000 employees, most of 
whom were situated in Hamburg and Kiel, the principal city in Schleswig- 
Holstein. HSH Nordbank actively remains engaged with the local community, 
organizing events for entrepreneurs and managers along with a charity run. Fur-
12 In 2013, 40 percent of its lending was to clients in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (HSH Nord-
bank 2013).
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thermore, in an interview, a senior official from the Federal Ministry for Financial 
Market Stabilisation stressed that politicians’ role on the bank’s board is extreme-
ly important for both the bank and the politicians, helping them achieve their re-
spective goals. This supports the argument that banks are systemically important 
for regional politics, while explaining HSH Nordbank’s influence at the local 
level, both financially and politically.
6.2.3  Result
Though the German government argued for systemic relevance of HSH Nord-
bank at the European Commission’s Competition commission hearing, especially 
its systemic importance to Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (European Commis-
sion 2009a), separate interviews with three members of the Bundestag who 
worked on financial matters at the time suggest a tension between regional views 
and national views of systemic importance. The interviewees argued that the gov-
ernment’s position at the Commission was strongly influenced by Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein, along with the local savings banks associations. The inter-
viewed members of the national parliament went on to highlight the suboptimal 
nature of the existing business model of HSH Nordbank, stating that it would 
have been better to allow the bank to fail than to continue operations.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we show how federalism can play a crucial and previously unno-
ticed role in determining which and how many banks politicians are likely to sup-
port when on the brink of insolvency. In doing so, we make a novel contribution 
to understanding how politicians view whether or not a bank is systemically im-
portant. In contrast to the previous literature on systemically important financial 
institutions, we do not take the financial system’s geographic scope for granted. 
Instead, we argue that what politicians view as the financial system and therefore 
which banks are systemically important is strongly influenced by the institutions 
of federalism. From this novel proposition, we argue that federations which give 
banking policy responsibility to sub-national politicians are likely to see public 
assistance given to relatively more and smaller banks than federations where na-
tional politicians exclusively control banking policy.
Indeed, in Germany where both the Federal and provincial governments have 
banking system powers, a very few small banks were allowed to fail outright dur-
ing the height of the 2008–09 financial crisis. Our approach allows us to under-
stand bank rescue decisions in Germany that previous work has been unable to 
explain. Federalism also shapes how governments interact after initial support 
has been provided. The European Commission’s Directorate General of Competi-
tion–which does not rely on German banks for support–was especially important 
in ultimately forcing the restructuring and winding down of failed banks that 
were being assisted by provincial and national politicians.
Our approach has clear distributive implications for banks and therefore 
should help us understand their behaviour as well. If it is true that sub-national 
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politicians are more likely to save smaller banks, smaller banks should be moti-
vated to lobby for supervision by sub-national governments. We actually have 
seen this type of activity in the recent negotiations regarding the establishment of 
the new European Banking Union.
German savings banks have lobbied strenuously to be excluded from supervi-
sion by the European Central Bank under the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
resolution under the Single Resolution Mechanism. This lobbying has been suc-
cessful. The new Single Supervisory Mechanism is mostly limited to the 120 or so 
largest banks, excluding smaller regional banks such as Germany’s savings banks 
(Steinhauser and Stevens 2013). Based on our work here we can predict that a 
crucial reason for this lobbying is not that the savings banks are worried about 
preventing bank bailouts in other EU Member States, but instead that they were 
trying to preserve the high likelihood of local government support they would 
receive in difficult times.
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